Closing Fireside Chat with the Assistant Attorney General for the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division by Baer, William & Weiser, Philip J.
University of Colorado Law School 
Colorado Law Scholarly Commons 
Articles Colorado Law Faculty Scholarship 
2016 
Closing Fireside Chat with the Assistant Attorney General for the 
U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division 
William Baer 
U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division 
Philip J. Weiser 
University of Colorado Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/articles 
 Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, Communications Law Commons, Law and 
Economics Commons, and the Legal Biography Commons 
Citation Information 
William Baer and Philip J. Weiser, Closing Fireside Chat with the Assistant Attorney General for the U.S. 
Department of Justice Antitrust Division, 15 COLO. TECH. L.J. 13 (2016), available at 
https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/articles/155. 
Copyright Statement 
Copyright protected. Use of materials from this collection beyond the exceptions provided for in the Fair Use and 
Educational Use clauses of the U.S. Copyright Law may violate federal law. Permission to publish or reproduce is 
required. 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Colorado Law Faculty Scholarship at Colorado Law 
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of Colorado Law 
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact jane.thompson@colorado.edu. 
 
13 
CLOSING FIRESIDE CHAT WITH THE 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR 
THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 
ANTITRUST DIVISION 
WILLIAM BAER* AND PHILIP J. WEISER** 
SILICON FLATIRONS CENTER 
BOULDER, COLORADO 
FEBRUARY 1, 2016 
 
 
WEISER: All right, this is a great pleasure to bring the 
conversation home with Bill Baer, who really does have an 
extraordinary background to set him up for his current job. He has 
worked in the antitrust world for—how long? 
BAER: Well, since the ‘70s. 
WEISER: I was going to say coming on 40 years, and you also 
had the benefit of taking antitrust law from Bill Baxter and 
having Bob Pitofsky as your mentor. So not only does he have the 
extraordinary background, but has also been trained by the very 
best. So we’ll have the chance for a discussion, we’ll get some folks 
involved in the end. I want to start with an important point I 
adverted to earlier, which is that competition policy is not 
necessarily limited to antitrust law as enforced by the courts. 
Could you explain a little bit your thoughts on that topic? 
 
 *  At the time this conference was held, William J. Baer was Assistant Attorney 
General for Antitrust in the United States Department of Justice. On April 17, 2016, 
President Obama asked Mr. Baer to become Acting Associate Attorney General of the 
United States. Press Release, DOJ, Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch Announces Bill 
Baer to Serve as Acting Associate Attorney General (Apr. 11, 2016), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-loretta-e-lynch-announces-bill-baer-
serve-acting-associate-attorney-general [https://perma.cc/LM95-VN72]. Assistant 
Attorney General Baer participated in this interview at the 16th annual Silicon 
Flatirons Center Digital Broadband Migration Conference on February 1, 2016. Video 
of this interview is available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C351xEX0h4g 
[https://perma.cc/3HH7-3DP4]. 
 **  Phil Weiser is the Hatfield Professor of Law and Telecommunications, Dean 
Emeritus, and Executive Director and Founder of the Silicon Flatirons Center for Law, 
Technology, and Entrepreneurship at the University of Colorado. From June 2011–
July 2016, Professor Weiser served as Dean after re-joining the Colorado faculty in 
June, 2011. From April 2010–June 2011, he served as the Senior Advisor for 
Technology and Innovation to the National Economic Council Director at the White 
House. From July 2009–April 2010, he served as the Deputy Assistant Attorney 
General at the United States Department of Justice's Antitrust Division. 
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BAER: Sure, but let me first thank you for the invitation to 
join you today. It has been quite an experience. As Phil mentioned, 
and as I said to him last night at dinner, it is an honor to be here. 
The manner in which people debate at this conference, the respect 
everyone has for differing points of view, and the constructive 
dialogue that occurs here, are all exceptional. It is an 
extraordinarily well-organized conference, and the way in which 
your team—the students—have worked to deal with the 
challenges presented by the snowstorm is just impressive. 
What we do at the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division—
at least my view of it—is, first and foremost, law enforcement. We 
go after cartels, we go after civil violations, and we take a slightly 
different, forward-looking view when it comes to mergers and 
acquisitions. That is core to what we do, and it’s also the core of 
what the FTC does. But, we need to think about where we fit in 
time and in space. And that really is, I think, the issue you’re 
raising. How do we think about the right role of antitrust 
enforcement? We are not pressing a view of antitrust enforcement 
über alles, which was discussed at the last panel yesterday.1 We 
have markets where there may be shortages, where there may be 
monopolies that have been created by regulation, by scarce inputs, 
and we need to think about how we enforce the law in those 
markets. 
We also need to think about ways in which we can 
communicate to people about how to make the market work best 
even though there’s a regulatory overlay to it. For an example of 
this, you can look to our advocacy at the state level about the 
medical industry, in particular regarding certificate-of-need 
requirements.2 The DOJ and FTC agree that these mechanisms 
are outdated and likely inhibit competition. You can think about 
some other occupational licensing requirements, that many states 
 
 1 The January 31, 2016, antitrust panel discussed the necessity of net neutrality 
rules, and whether or not antitrust law alone was sufficient to preserve competition. 
Silicon Flatirons, 2016 DBM: Antitrust, YOUTUBE (Feb. 4, 2016), 
https://youtu.be/HATXZohzzDo [https://perma.cc/4V4Z-EZV8]. 
 2 State “certificate-of-need” laws typically require, in some form, that hospitals 
and other health care providers obtain state approval before expanding, establishing 
new facilities or services, or making certain large capital expenditures. The Antitrust 
Division, working jointly with the Federal Trade Commission has on several occasions 
advocated that states repeal or limit the operation of these laws. See Press Release, 
DOJ, Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Support Reform of South 
Carolina Laws that Curb Competition, Limit Consumer Choice and Stifle Innovation 
for Health Care Services (Jan. 11, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-
justice-and-federal-trade-commission-support-reform-south-carolina-laws-curb 
[https://perma.cc/3VL7-JXBU]; Press Release, DOJ, Department of Justice and Federal 
Trade Commission Support Reform of Virginia Laws that Curb Competition, Limit 
Consumer Choice, and Stifle Innovation for Health Care Services (Oct. 26, 2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-and-federal-trade-commission-
support-reform-virginia-laws-curb-competition [https://perma.cc/4VLH-SWSA]. 
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have, that arguably do more to protect the professionals involved 
in that occupation than necessarily to provide meaningful 
competition that benefits consumers. We can think about the 
policy work we do with colleagues at the FCC on 
telecommunications, with the DOT and the FAA on 
transportation—a subject I think you mentioned yesterday3—and 
with the USPTO and others on intellectual property. That is to 
say, we are thinking about ways in which we can use our expertise 
to suggest how, in a regulated environment, part of the answer 
might be adjusting regulation so that competition can make that 
market deliver goods and services at the highest quality and 
lowest price to U.S. consumers. 
WEISER: One area that’s very much in the weeds of this 
discussion is spectrum, and how the market for spectrum is 
structured and developed by FCC decisions. The FCC, recently, for 
their incentive auction, has limited the ability of certain larger 
firms to buy more spectrum licenses. How does the DOJ work on 
those sorts of matters and collaborate with the FCC? 
BAER: That’s a great example of an FCC regulatory mandate 
to allocate newly available spectrum that broadcasters are giving 
up, and to structure the process of allocating it to benefit the 
public interest. It’s a great opportunity for us to weigh in on 
competitive effects. We’ve got a history in wireless 
telecommunications where a few incumbents have actually 
obtained a significant chunk of spectrum (in particular, the low-
frequency, high-value spectrum that can more easily penetrate 
buildings).4 The current market dynamic is that there are two 
really big players (Verizon and AT&T) and a third and fourth 
(Sprint and T-Mobile) that have less opportunity to build out. If 
you put this new chunk of spectrum out there for auction5, 
especially in areas where a particular firm has a high percentage 
of the already existing spectrum, the big players likely will have 
every incentive to pay the most because it increases their market 
 
 3 See Silicon Flatirons, 2016 DBM: Technological Change and Industry 
Structure, YOUTUBE (Feb. 3, 2016), https://youtu.be/iib9V_JQGxw 
[https://perma.cc/K386-LFY9]. 
 4 In 2014, the FCC reported that the two leading carriers had 73% of low-
frequency spectrum. Policies Regarding Mobile Spectrum Holdings Expanding the 
Econ. and Innovation Opportunities of Spectrum Through Incentive Auctions, WT Dkt. 
Nos. 12-268, 12-269, Report & Order, 29 FCC Rec. 6133, 6162 para. 58 (2014). 
 5 The FCC’s broadcast incentive auction is a process by which the FCC seeks to 
free up low-band spectrum for wireless use. The initial reverse auction stage consists of 
the FCC setting a target amount of spectrum to free, and then paying broadcasters to 
go off air or move to meet that target. The second “forward auction” stage consists of 
the FCC putting the cleared spectrum up for auction, with the amount owed to 
broadcasters acting as a reserve price. If the reserve price is not met, then the 
Commission lowers the target, and the process repeats until the reserve is met. How It 
Works: The Incentive Auction Explained, FCC, https://www.fcc.gov/about-fcc/fcc-
initiatives/incentive-auctions/how-it-works [https://perma.cc/7MJ4-NKZ4] (last updated 
Jan. 8, 2016). 
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power—it gives them more opportunity to exclude opportunities 
for rivals. We have been an active participant (I think we filed 
three comments)6 in that rulemaking process, taking the position 
that there should be a market power screen to prevent the most 
powerful players from increasing their power through buying 
more spectrum. And ultimately, the Commission under Tom 
Wheeler’s chairmanship adopted such a screen. 
WEISER: So, I’ve got a few different questions in the area of 
merger review that I would like to walk through with you. The 
first is a tricky one that doesn’t get litigated that much, so it rests 
a lot on the prosecutorial discretion of the Antitrust Division. In 
particular, how do you think about mergers where two markets 
are at issue and where you may have benefits in one market and 
there may be incremental harms in another? I’m thinking here 
about the DirecTV/AT&T merger where some people said there 
might be some incremental loss of video competition7, because in 
some parts of the country it was arguably a 4–3 merger, where 
number three and number four (or two and four) might be 
merging. But there are also efficiencies that could come from the 
merger. How, in general, do the antitrust authorities look at such 
cases? And if there’s anything about that specific case that you 
can comment on, we’d welcome that as well. 
BAER: Well, first I think we need to look at claims of 
efficiencies—whether they’re in-market or out-of-market—a little 
skeptically. And let me elaborate on that. As an initial matter, in 
merger enforcement, we are undertaking a difficult predictive 
exercise under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, which tells us that we 
should prevent the accumulation or acquisition of market power 
and err on the side of preventing the anticompetitive effects of 
mergers in their incipiency.8 In performing this predictive 
 
 6 See Policies Regarding Mobile Spectrum Holdings, WT Dkt. 12-269, Ex Parte 
Submission of DOJ Executive Summary (filed Apr. 11, 2013), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2013/04/15/295780.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/79PG-7WXL]; Letter from DOJ Antitrust Division, Policies Regarding 
Mobile Spectrum Holdings, WT Dkt. 12-269 (filed May 14, 2014), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2014/05/15/305961.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/C26B-H24P]; Letter from DOJ Antitrust Division, Policies Regarding 
Mobile Spectrum Holdings, WT Dkt. 12-269 (filed June 24, 2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/630891/download [https://perma.cc/J8GU-L47H]. 
 7 See, e.g., David Lazarus, Honestly Speaking, Consumers Lose in AT&T-
DirecTV Deal, L.A. TIMES (May 19, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-
lazarus-20140520-column.html [https://perma.cc/GU7T-PE5K]; Applications of AT&T 
Inc. and DIRECTV for Consent to Assign or Transfer Control of Licenses and 
Authorizations, MB Dkt. No. 14-90, 41, Petition to Deny of Free Press, (filed Sept. 16, 
2014), https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/7522820501.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q6V2-GY4W]. 
 8 15 U.S.C. § 18, as revised, prohibits stock acquisitions or mergers “where in 
any line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of the 
country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to 
tend to create a monopoly.” Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012). 
2016] CLOSING FIRESIDE CHAT BY ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL BAER 17 
exercise, our key job is to take a very hard look at whether there is 
the potential for there to be anticompetitive consequences—such 
as increased market power—from a particular merger, whatever 
the products or services at issue. Very often people come forward 
and say “but you should allow this merger because there are great 
benefits; we will be a more efficient competitor”—which, if there is 
a sufficient factual basis, is an argument our merger guidelines 
invite.9 Bill Baxter, whom you mentioned before, was my antitrust 
professor and a wonderfully thoughtful person. He thought 
efficiencies should count for zero. He totally bought into the 
longstanding Supreme Court case law that it is not the job of the 
antitrust agencies.10 I had a long conversation with him years ago 
about it, and his bottom line was basically that because it’s so easy 
to gin up a claim of cost savings, it’s very difficult to rely on 
efficiencies claims. The agencies are skeptical, but not that 
skeptical. 
In evaluating efficiencies, we take a couple steps. First, we 
take a look at whether or not there is likely to be a serious market 
power enhancement from the transaction. If we think that’s pretty 
likely and it’s a pretty significant enhancement in market power, 
we’re going to be highly skeptical of any efficiency claims, in-
market or out-of-market. Second, where there is a close call on the 
competitive effect, then we’re going to look more deeply to 
differentiate between efficiencies that past history suggests can be 
realized and those that history suggests cannot. 
In markets where there are examples of recent mergers, 
companies can come in and show us a trend line or show us what 
happened in the last deal—e.g., that they actually were able to 
lower overall costs and increase their competitiveness. That is just 
a long-winded way to say that if you can show us those sorts of 
evidence, and we don’t have a high level of concern about 
anticompetitive consequences in a particular market, we will take 
efficiencies claims into account. The courts say we don’t have to 
consider out-of-market efficiencies when we’re litigating.11 But 
frankly, if you’ve got a very minor risk of anticompetitive harm 
and demonstrably lowered costs likely to result from the 
consolidation, as a matter of prosecutorial discretion, a good 
antitrust enforcer will take a really hard look at that. 
WEISER: That’s helpful. Another matter that you have 
 
 9 See DOJ & FTC, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 10 (2010). 
 10 See, e.g., FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967) (“Possible 
economies cannot be used as a defense to illegality.”). 
 11 United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 370 (1963) (“If 
anticompetitive effects in one market could be justified by procompetitive consequences 
in another, the logical upshot would be that every firm in an industry could, without 
violating § 7, embark on a series of mergers that would make it in the end as large as 
the industry leader.”). 
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talked about before is the significance of disruptive innovation or 
mavericks. One case that comes to mind is in the wireless sector 
where T-Mobile has undertaken a lot of interesting experiments 
and they’ve been innovative in their marketing and product 
development.12 That sector is a beneficiary of merger policy that 
has maintained independent companies in that space. Is that a 
case from which we can learn something about how we see 
mavericks? One of the concerns people say: “Is the key aspect of 
the T-Mobile example just that it is an innovative leader? Or is it 
that they’re the number four player?” How do you connect the 
concepts of disruptive innovation and mavericks to market 
structure? 
BAER: Let me first use that example to go back to your prior 
question: One of the key defenses AT&T made in its failed effort to 
buy T-Mobile was a claim of efficiencies,13 but they gave up when 
both the FCC and the Antitrust Division said we’re going to the 
mat on this one. AT&T said they would not be able to build out 
LTE to more than 80% of American consumers unless we let this 
deal go through. And within months after their abandoning the 
deal, they were basically saying they thought they would shortly 
be able to build out LTE to 96% of American consumers. That’s 
one reason why taking those efficiency claims a little bit 
skeptically is an important thing for us to do. But, you know, that 
deal gets abandoned. What happens? Well, T-Mobile has to go to 
plan B. And it’s too bad that merger ever got proposed because the 
implementation of plan B was delayed for the about 18 months in 
which the deal was under scrutiny. And there is a cost to 
competition during that period when the merger is under review. 
Parties have a right to propose them. But it is one of the reasons 
why I think sellers increasingly are looking for reverse breakup 
fees, because they want to be compensated for that period of time 
when they’re stuck in this limbo. I have represented companies in 
these situations when the employees are going nuts; they don’t 
know what to do. And then, when it’s over, there is really a 
diminution in the competitive significance of the seller. Usually 
 
 12 William J. Baer, Assistant Att’y Gen., Remarks at the Chatham House Annual 
Antitrust Conference (June 18, 2015) (transcript available at 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-bill-baer-delivers-
remarks-chatham-house-annual-antitrust) [https://perma.cc/5LSA-R6FQ] (“[M]ore than 
three years after AT&T abandoned its bid [to acquire T-Mobile], T-Mobile remains a 
disruptive force for change. Characterizing itself as the ‘Un-Carrier,’ T-Mobile declares 
that it is ‘redefining the way consumers and business buy wireless services through 
leading product and service innovation.’”). 
 13 See Bureau Dismissal Without Prejudice of AT&T’s Applications for Transfer of 
Control of T-Mobile USA, Inc., WT Dkt. No. 11-65, Bureau Staff Analysis & Findings, 
paras. 89–90, 210–15 (Nov. 11, 2011), 
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-11-1955A2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/M282-8A5V]. 
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the buyer keeps pushing forward. 
What happened when T-Mobile had to go to plan B? They 
basically blew up the old format of how you would go to market, 
and offered plans without a two-year commitment and other 
consumer friendly options. Now they’re changing the way data is 
bought and paid for, and it has really disrupted that whole 
marketplace. You can see competitors have had to respond. We 
are benefiting from a degree of competition that did not exist 
before. And I’ll say that one of the first things that happened to 
me when I came into the job in 2013, was (and this is all public) 
Sprint’s owner came to me and said “all right, you wouldn’t let 
AT&T/T-Mobile go through, but why not let the third and fourth 
players in this market—Sprint and T-Mobile—combine; it will 
create a stronger number-three?” Well, everything we do know 
about the market, about the positioning of Sprint and T-Mobile, 
suggested that, in fact, this market could sustain four, and 
competition would be better for it. And, with the spectrum auction 
coming up, T-Mobile would be potentially in a position to deal with 
some of its disadvantages. There was about a three-month 
lobbying campaign to get us to change our minds, but with the 
combination of a sort of steeliness at the FCC and at the Antitrust 
Division, they gave it up. In the meantime, though, T-Mobile was 
continuing down plan B, and, as I said, we’ve seen the benefits of 
that. 
WEISER: One other issue that antitrust has to deal with is 
market definition. This is often viewed as a central foundational 
exercise, but it’s also a difficult one in technologically dynamic 
markets. Take two markets that antitrust enforcement has looked 
at over the last 20 years here: one is MCI WorldCom looking to 
merge with Sprint, where the market being affected included long 
distance, even with eminent Bell entry. And part of that was the 
merger guidelines talk about harm in a relevant market within [a] 
two-year period, and not really looking too much beyond that. 
Another one is XM merging with Sirius, where the merger was 
allowed to go forward in part because there was a belief that 
wireless broadband enabled smartphones were going to compete 
with the merged firm, even though it seemed almost certain at the 
time that this development was going to be more than two years 
out. How do you approach this question of market definition in 
technologically evolving markets? 
BAER: The challenge may be more apparent there, but it’s 
not different in-kind from what we have to do in a brick-and-
mortar or service-industry merger. As economic tools have 
evolved, we’ve tried to update our thinking and our horizontal 
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merger guidelines (which were last revised in 2010).14 You were 
probably at the front end of that exercise when you were at the 
Antitrust Division. We try in those guidelines to make clear that 
merger analysis should not be seen as simply a sequential thing 
(e.g., you define a product and geographic market, then you look at 
market shares, then you look at entry—is it likely to come in a 
timely and significant fashion—then you look to efficiencies that 
they offset). The reality is you’ve got to look at the competing 
firms, the degree to which they’re particularly close rivals, the 
degree to which a market may be so concentrated that there 
already is coordinated behavior going on, which was a concern we 
articulated in our challenge to the merger between U.S. Airways 
and American Airlines.15 When you look at the reality of the 
competition, you look at it today, but you also make sure you 
aren’t doing a static snapshot. You don’t let yesterday predict 
tomorrow. You take a look at where innovation has been going. 
You mentioned MCI/Sprint. I think a large part of the 
concern there related to the Internet backbone, which was the 
focus of the first cause of action in [the] complaint we filed in that 
action. If MCI and Sprint combined, they would have controlled 
about 53% of the Internet backbone, and that was the thing that 
concerned us most.16 And, looking at it today, that concern was 
fully justified. We also identified the other issues you raised, and 
our predictions about long-distance competition may have been 
wrong, and there has been more competition as things in that 
market evolved. But we did our best. So in a high-tech market, 
this sort of convention of “we’re just talking about two years” 
shouldn’t be viewed too rigidly—and our guidelines are more 
flexible about that. We do really want to get it right. We want to 
see where market evolution is going, and focus our analysis on 
important competitive dynamics. The further out you look, the 
harder it is to predict, but it is a legitimate thing to look at in 
these markets with fast-paced innovation. 
WEISER: One recent merger that came before the Antitrust 
Division is the Comcast/Time-Warner merger.17 You have been 
 
 14 DOJ & FTC, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (2010). 
 15 Amended Complaint at 14–16, U.S. v. US Airways Grp., Inc., No. 13-cv-1236 
(D.D.C. Sept. 5, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/file/514521/download 
[https://perma.cc/B6PF-ESL4]. 
 16 Complaint at 14, para. 32, U.S. v. WorldCom, Inc. (June 26, 2000), 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/file/516831/download 
[https://perma.cc/E8WN-2NL8]. 
 17 Press Release, DOJ, Comcast Corporation Abandons Proposed Acquisition of 
Time Warner Cable After Justice Dep’t and the Federal Communications Commission 
Informed Parties of Concerns (Apr. 24, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/comcast-
corporation-abandons-proposed-acquisition-time-warner-cable-after-justice-department 
[https://perma.cc/JEP9-PL99]. 
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quoted as saying that the concern there was that Comcast would 
have had too much control over, and too few competitors in, 
shaping the future of video competition and broadband Internet 
service. I believe the figure that you or others may have said is 
that post-merger Comcast would have served almost 60% of high-
speed broadband subscribers in the U.S.18 It looks like that 
concern is rooted in the merger guidelines statement—that a 
merger that would be likely to create a potential harm to 
competition, sort of an exclusionary harm, was at issue.19 What 
can you say about that case? And then as you think about it, how 
would you weigh making type I versus type II errors as you’re 
thinking about stopping a merger? How much do you worry about 
MCI WorldCom, if you would have got that one wrong versus if we 
didn’t stop it, all the harm that could come? That is part of the 
real challenge in making these judgments in incipiency: How do 
you approach that generally, and then specifically to 
Comcast/Time-Warner, what can you say about it? 
BAER: Well, let me start by saying that with Comcast/Time 
Warner, I was not actually involved in it because I was involved in 
a prior matter—the GE/Comcast deal—but I’ve learned some since 
then from what’s been said publicly, and as a result I have talked 
some about it. In Comcast/Time Warner, we really were worried 
that having one firm responsible for delivering content, providing 
high-speed Internet to almost 60% of U.S. homes, had the 
potential to distort competition both upstream and downstream. 
And it’s not unlike, I think, some of the issues that play out in the 
net neutrality debate. You have this “one pipeline” problem, where 
one entity controls the last mile connecting almost 60% of U.S. 
homes with high-speed Internet service, and it would give that one 
entity—Comcast—significant and disproportionate leverage in 
dealing with content providers that Comcast competes against in 
its video business.20 We worried that this combination would 
distort competition and, on the other hand, there were not 
particularly compelling efficiencies offered. As for efficiencies, we 
heard the argument that this was a great opportunity for Comcast 
to get more eyeballs, and maybe this would lower, marginally, the 
cost of program acquisition. But, it was not a compelling 
efficiencies story, whereas we had this substantial competitive 
 
 18 William J. Baer, Assistant Att’y Gen., Keynote Address at the Future of Video 
Competition and Regulation Conference at Duke Law School (Oct. 9, 2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-bill-baer-delivers-
keynote-address-future-video-competition [https://perma.cc/BN3N-7EAP] (“The 
combined firm [of Comcast and Time Warner] would have ended up with . . . controlled 
access to nearly 60% of the high-speed broadband subscribers in the U.S.”). 
 19 DOJ & FTC, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 1–2 (2010) (“Enhanced market 
power may also make it more likely that the merged entity can profitably and 
effectively engage in exclusionary conduct.”). 
 20 DOJ, supra note 17. 
22 COLO. TECH. L.J. [Vol. 15.1 
 
concern. 
Now, going to your broader point: It’s unusual, I think, that 
by blocking a merger where we have a plausible fact-based story of 
harm, you could thereby cause long-term injury to the market. I 
think what we did is really what the Clayton Act tells us to do—
err on the side of stopping a deal that risks competitive harm, and 
let companies compete and come up with a better mousetrap and 
grow that way. The notion that we should be very deferential to 
shortcuts—shortcuts by acquisition—is really what we try to 
guard against. That’s the basic framework. 
WEISER: So we have a number of students here who are 
interested in antitrust, as you can see from the chair you’re in 
now, and how lawyers help either oppose or defend proposed 
mergers. What advice do you have for the students about how to 
be an effective advocate for a particular position? 
BAER: Good question, and I think the hard part about being 
an effective advocate is appreciating that you’re not doing your 
client or yourself a service if you’re only thinking about advocating 
your own position. You can’t be subtle and effective, I think, 
without understanding the other side’s perspective on a matter 
and thinking about how you would argue it. You know, that is 
what a moot court or debate teaches you to do—flip it, think about 
the other side of something. And don’t be afraid to give the ground 
that the judge is going to see is already occupied by your 
adversary. It’s not that you have to win everything, you really 
have to suggest that your story, your argument—and I use those 
terms interchangeably—takes into account the relevant facts and 
on balance gets you to a good outcome. 
There is also, if you’re dealing with the government, a need to 
appreciate that you’re appealing to my—to our—prosecutorial 
discretion. If you come and act in a totally adversarial way, trying 
to persuade me to let you go your way by being two-dimensional, 
forceful, and not conceding anything, it is not terribly helpful. 
Remember that I’ve got a whole lot of confidential information 
that you don’t, and I’m trying to process it all. You need to get me 
to want to listen to you. If you’re representing a private party, you 
should know that we do learn a lot from our engagement with 
merging parties, with people involved in our conduct 
investigations. But when they come in guns blasting—sometimes 
at the staff level in particular—that shuts down that beneficial 
dialogue. And you want to win at the staff level, so if you’re in my 
office trying to convince me not to approve a staff recommendation 
to go to court, you are already in kind of a losing position even 
though I might have ended up agreeing with your position. But, 
you want to win at the staff level, and that involves a different 
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kind of three-dimensional engagement than some players actually 
use. 
WEISER: So, thinking about the staff, the Antitrust Division 
now has staff lawyers and staff economists. Edith Ramirez talked 
about the FTC developing a staff of technologists and engineers.21 
Can you see a day where the Antitrust Division, in different 
industries, with telecommunications being an obvious one, the 
information technology sector being another notable one, would 
start to not just retain outside experts, but maybe hire 
technologists to be part of the process? 
BAER: Yes, I can see that day. We’re not there yet, in part 
because the mandate of the FTC is broader.22 If you get into 
privacy and consumer protection areas, they probably had an 
earlier need for them than we do, and in the short-term we can 
take care of the need for that insight by using outsiders. I had a 
series of meetings in the last couple of weeks about how we do our 
investigations—and this is where a technologist would help—
where we’ve successfully transitioned from a hard document world 
to email and electronic copies; and we’re also transitioning to see 
situations where the communications that often are most 
revealing of criminal intent, or anticompetitive intent, in a 
conduct investigation, or even in a merger, aren’t retained 
anywhere. Mobile applications allow you to communicate and we 
don’t know enough about it. We’re figuring out how we’re going to 
do our job in the future.23 We do, as many of you know, a lot of 
price-fixing investigations (it’s about 40% of what the Antitrust 
Division does), and we work very closely with the FBI on those 
matters. We’ve got great partners over there that help get us 
educated on what to do and how to do it. We may need to actually 
use more covert activity because we’re not going to be able to get 
the email or cell phone data that we used to get that helps put a 
case together. 
WEISER: So, as I said earlier, you were extremely prepared 
for this job. What’s been the hardest part of the job for you? 
 
 21 Silicon Flatirons, 2016 DBM: Welcome & Fireside Chat, YOUTUBE (Feb. 1, 
2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9JksN2zy10w [https://perma.cc/PU63-P4CF] 
(It is “a top priority [for the FTC to hire technologists].” “[Technology is] an area that 
[the FTC] had to make an even greater investment because . . . given the role that 
technology plays in today’s world [the FTC] absolutely need[s] to have people who have 
the skill set to understand it.”). 
 22 See A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative and 
Law Enforcement Authority, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-
do/enforcement-authority [https://perma.cc/YRG9-HQ9Y] (last updated July 2008). 
 23 Tonja Jacobi & Jonah Kind, Criminal Innovation and the Warrant 
Requirement: Reconsidering the Rights-Police Efficiency Trade-Off, 56 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 759, 822 (2015) (“One response has been to design new technology that promotes 
privacy by the fleeting nature of its mode of communication—by destroying any record 
of communication, it becomes more difficult, though not impossible, for a third party to 
access the information.”). 
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BAER: The hardest part of the job was when I came in, 
January of 2013, and we had been through a two-year hiring 
freeze.24 We had sequestration, and my predecessor closed four of 
seven offices outside of DC, but with a promise that where 
anybody didn’t transfer to a remaining office we’d be able to hire 
to fill those positions, so there would be no net loss in bodies. And 
what happened was those offices were closed, and then the hiring 
freeze hit and we had our normal attrition. By the time I got to the 
Division in January 2013, we were at about 20 to 25% under our 
typical staffing level. And to basically keep momentum going, once 
we got permission ahead of the lifting of the hiring freeze, we 
began hiring to get our numbers back up. But, in my experience—
and those of you who have been associated with law firms know 
this too—when you bring in 60, 70, 80 people, the potential for 
people to get lost, or individuals (e.g., the partners and senior 
associates) not to invest because there are just too many, is 
overwhelming. So we’ve been focused on making our way 
intelligently through this hiring bubble, and we have hired 150 
people in 18 months—not all lawyers, a lot of them legal 
assistants, IT specialists, and economists. But to get them 
integrated, to get them up and running, to make sure they feel 
they have a stake in what we do and understand how we do it, to 
get them trained, to get them mentored—that has been the 
biggest challenge. It’s been a great challenge, and I think when I 
leave we will have renewed the talent pool in the Antitrust 
Division in an unprecedented way. But it’s a hard slog and we 
need, as managers, to spend a lot of time dealing with these 
issues. 
WEISER: When you came into the Division, or after you got 
there, and had a chance to get the lay of the land, did you develop 
any overall goals for your leadership? And, as you start looking 
back with the presidential election upon us, are there things 
you’re feeling proud of having been a part of moving forward? 
BAER: Yes, although I came in perhaps with fewer intentions 
of making mid-course corrections because there already had been 
some corrections that my predecessor, with whom you worked, 
Christine Varney, had started. And I talked with her. We talked 
about the job and what the priorities were. We discussed that 
there was a view out there that the Antitrust Division was 
reluctant to litigate, and that we needed to change that 
perception. If you’re perceived as afraid, people will be more 
 
 24 See Press Release, Dep’, Attorney General Holder Announces Justice 
Department to Lift Hiring Freeze (Feb. 10, 2014), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-holder-announces-justice-department-
lift-hiring-freeze [https://perma.cc/AZT5-XN7B]. 
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aggressive. For example, they’ll try to force cheap settlements on 
you in a merger matter. 
Your behavior responds to the perception of how talented the 
enforcer is, and how committed he or she is to using the tools of 
enforcement. And so by bringing in a bunch of experienced outside 
litigation talent, together with insiders who had some litigation 
experience and lots of antitrust knowledge, I think we successfully 
have shown that we’re willing to go to court, that we’re credible in 
court, and that—though we don’t necessarily win all the cases—
nobody has an easy fight against the Antitrust Division. That was 
one priority that was started before me, which I think we pushed 
even farther along. We are now, in an average year, in civil 
litigation (mergers, like Bazaarvoice;25 and conduct matters, like 
the eBooks case against Apple26), in court about three times as 
much in this administration as we were during the prior 
administration. So that’s changed, and I think it affects the way 
lawyers counsel about the risk of going forward with a particular 
course of conduct or a particular merger. That’s a good thing over 
the long run, and I think it’s very helpful. 
On the criminal side, I think one of my priorities, which was a 
little ahead of what people call the Yates Memorandum—issued 
by Sally Yates, the Deputy Attorney General—was that we really 
want to make sure that in prosecuting financial and other white-
collar crimes, we are holding corporations accountable, but also 
going after the most senior culpable officials.27 And we’ve actually 
upped our emphasis on that over the last three-and-a-half years. 
Now, on average, for every corporation that has been found guilty 
of an antitrust crime (they usually plead out, though not always), 
we have about two-and-a-half individual guilty pleas or 
convictions. So we aren’t letting the corporation take the hit and 
allowing the individuals to walk free. But you know 40 years ago 
an antitrust crime was a misdemeanor, and so we’ve had to get 
courts accustomed to treating antitrust crimes just like other 
white-collar crimes. And the average jail sentence has gone from 
about a year, ten years ago, to 25-26 months in the last few years. 
So that was another priority, and we’ve made good progress on 
that too. 
WEISER: That’s great. Let’s get some questions, again 
starting from students and I’m not afraid to call folks. 
Audience questions. 
 
 25 United States v. Bazaarvoice, Inc., No. 13-CV-00133-WHO, 2014 WL 203966 
(N.D. Cal. 2014). 
 26 United States v. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 27 Memorandum from Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Att’y Gen., to the Assistant 
Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., et al. (Sept. 9, 2015), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/dag/file/769036/download [https://perma.cc/XQ4P-JQBJ]. 
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